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LIABILITY OF MASTER FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED BY REASON OF A
BREACH OF A DUTY IMPOSED BY STATUTE.
It is a well settled rule of the common law that a servant up-
on entering his employment assumes the risk arising from all ob-
vious and apparent causes. The master is under an obligation to
furnish reasonable and safe materials and place in which to work.
But if he fails to do so and the servant continues in his employ.
ment, knowing of such failure or under such circumstances that he
ought to have known and thereby receives an injury, he cannot
hold the master liable, for by continuing in the employment he
assumes this very risk. This is the common law rule both in this
country and in England.
Many of the United States have statutes imposing upon em-
ployers of labor new and special duties. Many of these statutes
apply to factories and mills and require the owners thereof to take
some specific measure to guard-against injuries resulting from the
use of machinery. There have been many persons injured by rea-
son of a failure to comply with these statutes and many cases have
come before the courts in which a person sustaining such injury
seeks to hold the master liable. The defense of the master is in-
variably the doctrine of assumed risk. This presents a question of
absorbing interest and upon which the courts are in hopeless con-
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flict. Some holding that the defense is good and others holding
that it is not.
There seems, upon a careful examination of the cases, to be
three doctrines in this country. The first is that statutes imposing
specific duties upon the employer do not change the common law
rule relating to obvious risk and that the master is not liable to
the servant for injuries sustained as a result of the master's breach
of such duty. This doctrine is supported by the Federal courts ana
by some of the most respected of the state courts; among them.
being Alabama, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan and New
York.
A statute of Missouri required employers to guard all gear-
ings, cogs, etc. A master allowed a pair of cogwheels to remain-
unguarded and as a result an employee was injured. The United
States Circuit Court held that the servant could not recover from
the master because by remaining in the employment she had as-
sumed the risk arising from the master's breach of his statutory
duty. St. Louis Cordage Co., v. Miller, 126 Fed. 495. The same
court has very recently affirmed this doctrine. A statute of Colo-
rado required all railroad companies to securely block all frogs
and switch rails. A railroad company failed to comply with statute
and an employee while coupling cars caught his foot between the
rails and was thrown under the cars and severely injured. He
brought an action for damages against the company. The com-
pany defended on the ground of assumption of risk. The court
held that the said statute did not deprive the railroad company of
the right to defend on this ground. Denver & R. G. R. Co., v.
Norgate, 141 Fed. 247. This case expressly overrules Narramore
v. Ry. Co., 96 Fed. 298, which held that the statute deprived the
master of the defense in question. Judge Carland in a very able
opinion points out that the decision in the Narramore case was
based upon a wrong construction of the English cases and upon the
idea that an assumption of risk is a term of the contract of employ-
ment. Judge Carland denies that it is a matter of contract. In his
opinion it is a part of the law governing the relation of master
and servant and is independent of the will of either. "It is a prin-
ciple of the common law, and must be repealed, if at all, by the
lawmaking power . . . and depends in no manner for its exis-
tence upon the agreement of the parties." Denver & R. G. R. Co.
v. Norgate, supra.
The Factory Act of New York requires employers to guard
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exposed gearings. A young woman was injured while operating
a machine which was not guarded as required by the statute. The
court held that she had assumed the risk and therefore could not
recover. They held the statute to be penal in its nature and not
in any way affecting the rights of the servant. Knisely v. Pratt,
148 N. Y. 372. The statute does not abrogate the common law rule
that if the servant knows of the unguarded condition and appre-
ciates the risk he cannot call upon his employer for indemnity.
McRickard v. Flint, 114 N. Y. 222; Goodridge v. Washington
Mills Co., i6o Mass. 234. The servant cannot recover for an in-
jury resulting from an open and obvious defect caused by the mas-
ter's failure to perform a statutory duty. O'Malley v. S. Boston
Gaslight Co., 158 Mass. 135; Spiva v. Mining Co., 88 Mo. 68.
The second doctrine is that, if the statute is a mere affirma-
tion of the common law, the rule remains the same; but if it sets
up a definite standard and requires specific measures to be taken by
the master, the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply and
the master is liable. This doctrine is supported by the courts of
Illinois, Indiana, Tennesee and Wisconsin.
A statute of Illinois provided that all cages used in mine
shafts should be covered. A man working in a mine and know-
ing that the cage was uncovered was injured as a result. The
court allowed him to recover and said that his right of recovery
in no way depended upon his use of reasonable care and that it
could not be precluded by his contributory negligence. Cotlett
v. Young, 143 Ill. 74. See also Coal Co. v. Hoodlet, 129 Ind. 327.
In Boyd v. Brazil Coal Co., 25 Ind. App. 157, the court said: "We
believe, however, that the maxim volenti non fit injuria or doctrine
of assumption does not apply to a statutory duty imposed upon the
master, and the continuing of statutory duty imposed upon the
master with knowledge of such breach of duty will not prevent a
recovery for an injury suffered by reason of such breach." The
doctrine of the courts of Tennessee is announced in the case of
R. R. v. Smith, 6 Heisk. 174. The decision is to the effect that
where an accident occurs by reason of a noncompliance with the
statute, the right of action in favor of the injured party is absolute,
and that his contributory negligence is no bar.
The third doctrine is that a sharp distinction must be drawn
between assumption and contributory negligence. The cases sup-
porting this doctrine hold that a man may continue in his employ-
ment knowing of his master's breach of his statutory duty and if
injured he may recover, provided only that he, the employee, was
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using reasonable care. Contributory negligence is an absolute de-
fense. Grand v. R. R. Co., 83 Mich. 564.
The first doctrine seems to us to be the soundest and most
reasonable. The proposition that the servant cannot assume, is
unsound and untenable. There is absolutely no reason why he may
not assume the obvious risk of a particular business as well under
a statute as at common law. No rule of public policy forbids him,
with good and sufficient reason, to accept employment subject to
the rule of assumed risk. No statute can take away from a man
the right to manage his own affairs, provided that in doing so he
respeots the rights of others. The question whether a plaintiff
can recover for a breach of a statutory duty, notwithstanding an
assumption of risk or contributory negligence on his part, is one
upon which, as we have seen, there is a great conflict of opinion
but we think the clear weight of authority is against such recovery.
It is well settled that a statute does not change the common law
unless such an intention plainly appears. If the employee with
full knowledge undertakes to accomplish the task assigned to him,
at the place and in the manner proposed, he ought not to be heard
to complain when the conditions and methods are precisely as he
expected them to be and to which he has assented. Martin v. R. R.
Co., 118 Iowa 148. In such a case it is immaterial that the danger
might have been guarded against by the employer, even if the
failure is in violation of the statute. The responsibilities which by
common law the servant must assume and exercise are not af-
fected by the statute unless the statute provides so expressly.
Powell v. Ashland, 98 Wis. 35-
The following are the leading English cases upon this ques-
tion. 18 Q. B. D. 685 ; I8 Q. B. D. 647; 21 Q. B. D. 220; 21 Q. B.
D. 371; 7 Ex. 13o.
LABOR LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY OF CONTRACT.
The case of People v. Marcus, 97 N. Y. Supp. 322, recently
decided by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York, limits the extent to which labor legislation may be carried
and presents this interesting and much -mooted question from a
new standpoint.
In that state it had been provided by statute (Penal Code,
Sec. 71A) that any employer of labor who should coerce or com-
pel anyone to refrain from joining any labor organization as a
condition of such person securing employment, should be deemed
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guilty of a misdemeanor. The defendant in the present case, hav-
ing been tried and convicted for violation of this act, moved in
arrest of judgment on the ground that the statute contravened the
fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution and also the
State Constitution, in that it restrained the freedom of contract
for a purpose neither intended nor appropriate to protect the pub-
lic health nor promote the general welfare. The motion having
been denied, an appeal was taken.
It is a fundamental principle that a man in the exercise of his
civil rights "must be left at liberty to refuse business relations
with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests upon rea-
son or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice or malice.'7
Cooley, Torts, 328. But by the exercise of a doctrine of compara-
tively modem origin, this right may be limited by the state in the
exercise of its police power when it becomes necessary for the
protection of the public health, morals or welfare, although the ex-
tent to which legislation on these grounds has been sought has
been restrained by many recent and noted cases. Sochner v. New
York, 198 U. S. 45; Wright v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330.
It has been frequently adjudicated under the federal and New
York constitutions that an employer has a right to refuse to employ
union men or an employee has a right to refuse to rwork with non-
union men. Hence the agreements which the New York Statute
declares to be criminal were such as in the absence of this pro-
vision the parties had a constitutional right to make. It was
sought by the state to sustain this legislation on the theory 'that
such agreements would have a tendency to disturb the public peace
and order. But as is forcefully pointed out in the opinion of the
court delivered by Justice Laughlin, it is not competent for a leg-
islature to restrict one's constitutional rights upon the theory that
in the exercise of the same, others will become so incensed as to
violate the law and create a public disorder. "It is the duty of the
state and nation to protect every citizen in the exercise of his
constitutional rights and so long as the state and nation last,
inability or unwillingness to perform that duty may not be as-
signed as a justification for a law making the exercise of
one's constitutional rights a crime. . ., It follows that the
object sought to be accomplished by the Legislature under
this penal statute is one which must be left to peaceful agitation
and public sentiment and individual freedom of action." Accord-
ingly, the act was held to be unconstitutional, the judgment of
conviction reversed and the defendant discharged.
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Whether in its application to domestic corporations such a
provision of the Penal Code would be sustained under the power
of the Legislature to alter, amend or repeal corporate charters, is
a question not passed upon by the court but it seems reasonable
to suppose that the provision would be good under such conditions
and circumstances.
Many of the leading cases pertaining to this general subject
are reviewed and briefly digested in the opinion. The decision is
interesting in view of the growing importance and prevalence of
this character of legislation.
DIVORCE: SCOPE OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of Haddock v. Haddock, handed down April i6, i9o6,
puts an end to a much mooted question by holding that a divorce
granted to a plaintiff lawfully domiciled within a state as against
a defendant domiciled in another state, who has been served by
publication or letter only, is not required to be recognized as valid
outside of the state in which it was granted under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause -of the Federal Constitution. It is admitted that
by reason of the inherent power which every state possesses to de-
termine and regulate the marital relations of its own citizens, that
where its courts conformably to the laws of the state have acted
concerning the dissolution of the marriage tie, as to a citizen of that
state, such action is binding in that state as to such citizen Maynard
v. Hill I25 U. S. 19o. Such judgments, however, as against a
defendent domiciled in another state are always open to question
as to whether there was jurisdiction over such defendant. It is
an elementary principle that no court can lawfully adjudge rights
of persons or property in the absence of jurisdiction; and it is firm-
ly settled that a judgment of a court of another state is binding
on another state only so far as the court rendering it had juris-
diction. It is not protected by the Constitution and laws of the
United States from attack for want of jurisdiction. If rendered
without jurisdiction, it is not a judgment but a more arbitrary pre-
scription without force as a judicial proceeding in another forum.
Bank v. Wiley 195 U. S. 259.
There are two cases in which divorces are always entitled to
extra territorial efficacy. I, Where both husband and wife are
domiciled in the state rendering the divorce, Cheever v. Wilson 9
Wall, 1O8. 2, Where the husband is domiciled in a state which is
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also the domicile of matrimony, the courts of such state having
jurisdiction over the husband may, in virtue of the duty of the
wife to be at the matrimonial domicile, disregard an unjustifiable
absence therefrom, and treat the wife as having her domicile in
the state of the matrimonial domicile for the purpose of the disso-
lution of the marriage, and as a result have power to render a
judgment dissolving the marriage which will be binding upon both
parties, and will be entitled to recognition in all other states by
virtue of the full faith and credit clause, Atherton v. Atherton i81
U. S. 155. With the exception of the above cases, however, it is
well settled, that no state can exercise jurisdiction and authority
over persons, or property without its territory. Its laws and the
judgments of its tribunals can have no extra territorial oper-
ation. The state may determine the status of its own citizen
toward the citizen of another state but as to the latter it affects
nothing and is void, unless personal service is made on him or he
appears in the proceedings. Its judgments cannot push their effect
over the borders of another state, to the subversion of its laws and
defeat of its policy; nor seek across its borders the person of one of
its citizens, and fix upon him a status against his will and with-
out his consent. People v. Baker 76 N. Y. 78; Lynde v. Lynde
162 N. Y. 405; Winston v. Winston 165 N. Y. 553; Cummington
v. Belchertown 149 Mass. 223; Flower v. Flower 42 N. J. E. 152.
In a few other states an exactly opposite view is taken, and
it is held that a state cannot be deprived, directly or indirectly, of its
sovereign power to regulate the status of its own domiciled citi-
zens, by the fact that the citizens of other states, as related to them,
are interested in that status, and in such a manner has a right, under
the general law, judicially to deal with and dissolve the marriage
relation, binding both parties by its decree, by virtue of its inherent
power over its own citizens. The general law does not deprive a
state of its proper jurisdiction over the condition of its own citizens,
because non-residents, foreigners, or domiciled inhabitants of other.
states, have not or will not become, and cannot be made to become,
personally subject to the jurisdiction of its courts; but upon most
familiar principles its courts may and can act conclusively in such
a matter upon the rights and interests of such persons, giving them
such notice, actual or constructive as the nature of the case ad-
mits of, the purpose of such notice being to give to persons outside
the jurisdiction the chance to appear in the proceedings, Gould v.
Crow 57 Mo. 200; Antony v. Rice iO Mo. 233; Ditson v. Ditson
4 R. I. 87.
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A third view of the subject taken in some states, is that di-
vorces rendered in one state should be recognized as valid in others
on the ground of comity. The courts holding this view proceed
upon the ground that the preservation of good morals and a proper
regard of social relations make it desirable that such a decree should
be considered valid not only where it is pronounced, but in every
other jurisdiction, provided the grounds upon which it is based are
recognized in such jurisdictions as justifying the decree, Thompson
v. State 28 Ala. "i2; Harding V. Allen 9 Me. 14o; Felt'v. Felt 59 N.
Y. E. 6o6; Shafer v. Bushnell 24 Wis. 372. In view of the fact
that harmony among the different states in regard to divorce laws
is essential to the preservation of good morals, this third view of
the subject would seem to commend itself as the most reasonable,
for it would certainly be a most inconsi-tent position to assert the
right of one state to dissolve a marriage for a given cause and then
decline to give effect to a judgment of a sister state in a strictly
analogous case. Brown, Harlan, Brewer, Holmes; four justices
dissenting.
CONTRACT OF COMMON CARRIER LIMITING ITS LIABILITY FOR LOST
BAGGAGE DOES NOT APPLY TO HAND LUGGAGE.
The recent case of Holmes v. North German Lloyd Steamship
Co. 77 N. E. 21, decides that where a steamship company sells a
ticket, limiting its liability for loss of the holder's baggage; and
where hand baggage is delivered to the company's baggage master,
at his direction and on his statement that it would be sent to the
passenger's room, the company is liable for the full value in case
of loss, notwithstanding such limitation.
A common carrier may, by special contract, limit his common-
law liability; but he cannot stipulate for exemptions from the con-
sequences of his own negligence or that of his servants. New
Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants Bank, 6 How. 344. In Rail-
road v. Lockwood, 17 Vall 357, it was held that a common carrier
cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from responsibility when
such exemption is not just and reasonable in the eye of the law.
In Gibbons v. Paynton, 4 Burrows, 2298, Lord Mansfield said: "A
common carrier, in respect of the premium he is to receive runs the
risque of the goods, and must make good the loss, though it hap-
pen without any fault in him, the reward making him answerable
for their safe delivery. His warranty and insurance is in respect
of the reward he is to receive, and the reward ought to be propor-
tionable to the risque. If he makes a greater warranty and insurance,
he will take greater care, use more caution, and be at the expense of
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more guards or other methods of security; and, therefore he ought,
in reason and justice, to have a greater reward."
In the case before us four of the judges concurred in the ren-
dition of the judgment against the company. Three of the judges
dissented. The court held that the provisions of the passage ticket
did not apply to luggage intended to be taken by the passenger
to her stateroom for use during the voyage, but only to such as
might be delivered to the defendant to remain in its possession un-
til the termination of the voyage. As to baggage of a passenger
delivered to its exclusive possession, the carier assumes the full
liability of a common carrier and is an insurer. Powell v. Myers,
26 Wend, 591. Where baggage remains partly in custody of the
passenger the rule is different. It has been held that a company
is not liable for the theft of an overcoat taken from a seat in a
car, except in case of negligence. Carpenter v. N. Y., N. H. & H.
1?. R. Co., 124 N. Y. 53- When property is stolen from the state-
room in which the passenger deposits his baggage for his use dur-
ing the voyage the company is liable. Adams v. N. J. Steam-
boat Co., 15o N. Y. 163. The court further decided that the lan-
guage of the ticket, which is to be construed against the carrier,
supports the view that it was not intended to include baggage tak-
en by the passenger into his cabin for use during the voyage. It
provided that if the value of the passenger's effects exceeded $ioo,
freight at a certain rate should be paid thereon. Certainly it could
not have been expected that the personal effects of the passenger
taken into his cabin or stateroom, the use of which changed from
day to day, or, during the same day, should be paid for as freight.
A strong dissenting opinion was written. The contentions of
the minority of the court were as follows: The contract was com-
prehensive enough to include all kinds of property, and had there
been any intention to make any exceptions it would have so stated.
It made no difference whether the custody was for the whole of
the voyage or part. The moment the defendant became responsible
for them at all, the liability, necessarily was measured by the value
theretofore agreed upon, if not then otherwise declared. It is just
to hold the shipper to his agreement, fairly made, as to the value,
even where loss or injury has occurred through the negligence of
the carrier. The effect of the agreement is to cheapen the
freight and secure the carriage; and the effect of disregarding
the agreement, after a loss, is to expose the carrier to a greater
risk than the parties intended he should assume. Hart v. Penn. R.
R. Co., 112 U. S. 331.
